Conditional probability distributions seem to have a bad reputation when it comes to rigorous treatment of conditioning. Technical arguments are published as manipulations of Radon±Nikodym derivatives, although we all secretly perform heuristic calculations using elementary de®nitions of conditional probabilities. In print, measurability and averaging properties substitute for intuitive ideas about random variables behaving like constants given particular conditioning information.
Introduction
In elementary probability courses one learns to calculate conditional probabilities by taking ratios, sometimes on little intervals that shrink to a point at the end of a proof. Conditional probability distributions are used and enjoyed freely, in restricted settings. In more advanced courses, where conditioning is placed on a rigorous measure-theoretic basis, one learns that real probabilists use Radon±Nikodym derivatives. One is warned that only in special cases can the conditional expectation H X t X j T t be treated rigorously as the expectation of the random variable X with respect to a probability measure Á j T t that concentrates on the set fT tg. Instead, in the abstract Kolmogorov approach, H X Á is characterized up to almost-sure equivalence as the measurable function for which fT P BgH X T fT P BgX 1 for all measurable B. (Note that we are using linear functional notation for expectations, as explained at the end of this section.) The abstract approach has the virtue of making X j T t well de®ned (up to an almost sure equivalence) as a function of t whenever X is integrable. It has the disadvantage of sacri®cing intuition to rigor. Conditional probability distributions are clearly missed in some advanced work. Probabilists and statisticians often really do think in terms of conditional distributions, returning to them for private side calculations performed to get initial understanding of a problem. One ®rst guesses the form of H X t, perhaps with the help of an unjusti®ed manipulation of the nonexistent probability measure Á j T t, or by a hand-waving reduction to the discrete case. Then the proof reduces to a mechanical checking of the necessary measurability and averaging properties. Moreover, attempts to construct rigorous arguments using only elementary methods of conditioning can lead to the imposition of extraneous regularity conditions. Such attempts also lead to contortions, such as the introduction of unnecessary random variables and maps that transform the problem to a setting in which conditional densities may be calculated as ratios of joint to marginal densities on Euclidean spaces.
In this paper we discuss an approach to conditioning that combines the advantages of both the elementary and the abstract Kolmogorov approaches. We advocate the use of disintegrations, which are regular conditional distributions Á j T t that also satisfy natural concentration requirements of the form fT T t j T tg 0. We borrow the term``disintegration'' from the French to emphasize the extra concentration property. The level of generality achievable by the disintegration approach to conditioning is much higher than with elementary methods. The extra requirements do sacri®ce slight generality compared with the abstract Kolmogorov approach, but in the problems that we consider the generality is not missed. As compensation, arguments using disintegrations tend to look and feel much closer to the elementary arguments; by aiming for slightly less generality, we get to make stronger statements that come closer to the way that we tend to think intuitively about conditioning.
Consider a typical example.
Example 1. The intuitive de®nition of suciency says that a statistic T is sucient for a family of probability measures f X P Yg if the conditional distributions given T do not depend on . The elementary approach is based on conditional distributions, which work ®ne in the simplest discrete and absolutely continuous settings, but are typically abandoned in rigorous treatments that aim for any more generality. As LE EH HM MA AN NN N (1959, page 18) noted, there are some``diculties concerning the behavior of conditional probabilities'' that make a precise analysis delicate.
As an example, suppose is the uniform distribution on the square 0Y 2 , for an unknown positive . The coordinate maps X and Y are independent Uniform 0Y under . The maximum, M, of X and Y is a sucient statistic. Given M m, the conditional distribution Á j M m is uniformly distributed around two edges where one of X or Y equals m and the other is smaller. One could argue informally, by conditioning on fm M m g and then letting tend to zero, to get the form of the conditional distribution. It is also easy to check the Radon±Nikodym property by direct calculation of probabilities, but we feel that it is helpful to be able to think of the conditional distribution concentrated around the two edges where M m.
Frequently one sees suciency for this particular example demonstrated by an appeal to a factorization theorem for the joint density of X and Y. A diligent student might be dismayed to learn that the form of that theorem needed in the present simple case is beyond the scope of most textsÐtypically one is oered the proof for the simple, discrete version of the theorem, with a suggestion to read about the general case in the thorough text of LE EH HM MA AN NN N (1959) . Even there, one might suspect that the simple proof (page 19) for smooth continuous distributions might have small problems with the non-dierentiability of the maximum function. To be really rigorous one seems forced to skip forward several sections (to page 46) to ®nd Lehmann's treatment of the HA AL LM MO OS S and SA AV VA AG GE E (1949) approach, based on Radon± Nikodym derivatives.
Is it really that complicated? See Example 6. & R, 1979 ) that there should be such a wide gap between intuition and rigor in conditioning arguments. We feel that, in many statistical problems, manipulation of the conditional probability distribution is the most intuitive way to proceed. However, we mathematical statisticians are trained to treat such conditional distributions with great caution, being aware of the menagerie of nasty counterexamplesÐsuch as the Borel paradoxÐthat warn one away from conditional distributions. Apparently such examples have left conditional distributions with a bad name. As KO OL LM MO OG GO OR RO OV V (1930, page 51) put it,``the concept of a conditional probability with regard to an isolated hypothesis whose probability equals 0 is inadmissible.'' There is a technical diculty, but it does not require us to abandon the notion of a conditional distribution. We feel our profession may have overreacted to the diculties of placing conditioning on a sound basis and, in so doing, given up too much of the power of intuition.
It has long bothered us (and other authors, such as TJ JU UR R, 1974 and WI IN NT TE ER
By way of a small amount of theory and a collection of illustrative examples, in this paper we present a case that disintegrations are easy to manipulate and that they recapture some of the intuition lost by the more abstract approach, allowing guiltfree manipulation of conditional distributions. Most of our mathematics is well known and well used in certain areas of probability theory, such as Markov process theory. The disintegration property is essentially the assertion of the Decomposition Theorem in Section 29.2 of LO OE E Á Á V VE E (1978) , or of Theorem 6 in Section 2.5 of LE EH HM MA AN NN N (1959) . (For further references see Section 5.) Nevertheless, it seems to us that the ideas are not as widely known or used as they should be, which is our reason for collecting together some of the facts we might easily have learned in graduate school, but didn't. We suggest that the concept of disintegration should be part of the education of every young probabilist and mathematical statistician.
In Section 2 we outline some theory for disintegrations, which we apply to a collection of conditioning examples in Section 3. We would suggest that the reader might contemplate how one usually attacks these problems, before looking at our explanations. We were all too often surprised and embarrassed by how much diculty we were having using traditional methods as a ®rst pass on the problems during the drafting of the paper.
With some slight trepidationÐwe fear some readers might take fright at the absence of integral signsÐwe have chosen to use notation that we have found most convenient and most helpful to our understanding. We adopt linear functional notation for integrals, writing l f instead of fdl or f xldx. We also identify sets with their indicator functions: l fA instead of f x1fx P Agldx. When we want to identify explicitly the dummy variable of integrationÐfor example, when integrating a function of more than one variableÐwe do so by attaching a superscript to the measure: l y f xY y is the same as f xY yldy. We also adopt a slightly unusual notation for image measures. If T is a measurable function from Y e into Y f, and if l is a measure on Y e, we denote the image measure of l under the map T by Tl, or simply Tl. It is de®ned by Tlg lg T for nonnegative measurable functions g on Y f. If l is a point mass at x 0 then Tl is a point mass at Tx 0 . If g is the indicator function of a set B then g T is the indicator function of the inverse image T À1 B, and TlB lT À1 B. That is, our Tl is the same as the measure sometimes denoted by lT À1 . If l is a probability measure, Tl is also called the distribution of T under l.
What is a disintegration?
In the elementary approach to conditioning, there are two ways to calculate conditional distributions. In the discrete case everything reduces to ratios of probabilities. For continuous distributions on Euclidean spaces (that is, distributions absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure), with conditioning on the projection onto a coordinate space, one calculates conditional densities by dividing marginal densities into joint densities. Conditioning on other random variables (or vectors) presents some diculty when contemplated in any generality. Special transformations under extra smoothness assumptions are needed to reduce the calculations to the special case.
In this section we will describe a method that covers both discrete and continuous cases with equal ease. The same formulae appear in all cases. But ®rst let us consider the elementary discrete case in more detail.
For discrete random variables conditioning is straightforward, as long as we heed the admonition not to try to condition on events of probability zero. Suppose is a probability measure on Y e. Suppose T takes values only in a ®nite subset of , with fT tg b 0 for all t in . The elementary de®nition has A j T t AfT tg fT tg for A e and t Following KO OL LM MO OG GO OR RO OV V (1933), we will also use the more compact t (A) for A j T t. The elementary de®nition enjoys the following pleasant properties.
(a) t ( . ) is a probability measure on Y e for all t P .
(b) The measure t concentrates on the set fT tg:
The decomposition in property (c) writes as a weighted sum of the conditional probability measures t for t in , where the measure t concentrates on the level set fT tg. Notice that fT tg is the mass placed by the image measure T at the point t. In our notation, the averaging property in (c) is written
We would like with equal assurance to be able to talk about and work with conditional probabilities of the form A j T t for more general spaces Y e and maps T. The standard Kolmogorov de®nition of conditional expectation has an accounting problem: for each A P e the measurable function A j T t is free to be de®ned arbitrarily on any set of probability zero, and as there are in general many events A P e, those sets of probability zero could accumulate into a nonnegligible set. Worse yet, however many events there may be, there are still more sequences of events. For each such disjoint sequence A 1 , A 2 , . . . , we have relations like
holding, at least almost surely, in the sense that there exists a set N for which fT P Ng 0 and for which (2) holds if t T P N. The set N depends on the particular sequence {A i }. Thus, the unpleasant prospect arises that there might be no t for which (2) holds simultaneously for all sequences A 1 , A 2 , . . . of disjoint events. These considerations are the familiar motivation for introducing the concept of a regular conditional distribution. Under stronger assumptions than required for the existence of Kolmogorov's conditional expectations, one can choose appropriate versions of each A j T t, as a function of t, to make Á j T t a probability measure for (almost) all t. The slightly stronger notation of a disintegration also requires Á j T t to concentrate on the set fT tg.
For the general de®nition of a disintegration we will consider not just probability measures, but also measures (such as Lebesgue measure) that have in®nite total mass. Let T be a measurable map from Y e into Y f. Let l be a sigma-®nite measure on e and " be a sigma-®nite measure on f. Here l is the measure to be disintegrated and " is often the image measure Tl, although, as we will see below, it is useful to admit other possibilities for m, especially to cover cases where Tl is not sigma®nite.
Definition 1. We say that l has a disintegration fl t g with respect to T and m, or a TY "-disintegration, if:
(i) l t is a sigma-®nite measure on e concentrated on fT tg, that is, l t fT T tg 0, for "-almost all t;
and, for each nonnegative measurable f on :
We will refer to the fl t g as the disintegrating measures and to " as the mixing measure. We will also write lÁ j T t for l t Á on occasion.
Requirement (i) is analogous to property (b) in the discrete case; requirement (iii) is the analog of (c) generalized to functions. As de®ned by DE EL LL LA AC CH HE ER RI IE E and ME EY YE ER R (1978, page 78) the disintegrating measures fl t g are required to be probability measures, analogously to (a). However we ®nd that it is better to hold that property in reserve, and allow more general disintegrating measures. (Purist disintegrators might prefer us to invent yet another name.) As we will soon demonstrate, the l t can be taken as probability measures if and only if the image measure Tl is sigma-®nite and we take " to be that image measure. In that case we will speak of a T-disintegration, omitting explicit mention of ".
When l and (almost) all the l t are probability measures we will also refer to the disintegrating measures as (regular) conditional distributions or (regular) conditional probabilities; we will usually write and t , instead of l and l t , in this case. If X is a -integrable random variable, its expecation with respect to t is then a version of the conditional expectation X j T t. As shown in Section 6, the concentration property (i) for conditional probabilities is a simple consequence of (1) when the sigma-®nite f contains all singleton sets and is countably generated. Thus a disintegration of a probability measures may be thought of as resulting from a careful selection of versions of the conditional expectations (in Kolmogorov's sense), in a way that eliminates awkward complications caused by uncountable families of negligible sets. Not surprisingly, as with many stochastic process problems involving uncountable families of random variables, we need some extra (topological) assumptions about the underlying spaces and maps to ensure existence of the disintegration.
It might appear that, as a proper probabilist or mathematical statistician, one should be interested only in the case where the disintegrating measures are probabilities. However, then one could not recover as a special case of a general disintegration result the elementary formula for calculating a conditional density (with respect to Lebesgue measure) as a ratio of a joint density to a marginal density. It would also hamper the improper urges of Bayesians with their priors (see Example 9).
Example 2. Suppose l is a product of two sigma-®nite measures, l # ", on a product space . Let T be the map that projects onto the coordinate space. For example, l might be Lebesgue measure on 2 and m might be Lebesgue measure on the x-axis.
Think of ftg as a copy of imbedded into the product space, and let l t be # living on that copy. With a mild abuse of notation we will write l t #. (More formally, let l t be the image of l under the map s U 3 sY t, for t ®xed.) Then Fubini's theorem implies that fl t g is a TY " disintegration of l. As in the case of Lebesgue measure on 2 , the image measure Tl is not sigma-®nite unless # is a ®nite measure. So it is handy that the de®nition of a TY "-disintegration does not require m to be the image measure Tl. Moreover, there is no way to get a disintegration with almost all l t probability measures if # is not ®nite. &
One grudge held against disintegrations concerns existence. The abstract Kolmogorov approach to conditioning requires only pure measure theory; disintegrations, in general, are tainted by topological requirements, but they deliver more in terms of natural and useful properties. There is the usual trade-o: stronger requirements give stronger properties. We believe that the extra generality sacri®ced by restricting to situations in which disintegrations exist will not be missed in many statistical applications.
We have found the following version of the existence theorem quite adequate, even though it is not the most general possible. We require that l be a Radon measure (also known as a tight measure) on a metric space. That is, l is a Borel measure for which lK`I for each compact K and lB sup K B lK, the supremum being taken over compact sets, for each Borel set B. For example, a ®nite Borel measure on a complete, separable metric space is RadonÐsee Theorem 1.4
of BI IL LL LI IN NG GS SL LE EY Y (1968).
Theorem 1. (Existence Theorem) Let l be a sigma-®nite Radon measure on a metric space and let T be a measurable map from into Y f. Let " be a sigma-®nite measure on f that dominates the image measure Tl. If f is countably generated and contains all the singleton sets {t}, then l has a TY "-disintegration. The l t measures are uniquely determined up to an almost sure equivalence: if fl
Notice that the uniqueness assertion is much stronger than the almost sure uniqueness of X j T t for each integrable X in the Kolmogorov approach to conditioning. It requires existence of a single "-negligible set N such that l t A l
The proof of existence is just dicult enough to intimidate the typical graduate student, even though versions of it appear in many texts. We sketch a proof in the Appendix, to make the point that, with the possible exception of one topological/ measure-theoretic fact, the argument is within the reach of most graduate probability courses.
On occasion, one works only with conditional probabilities of events involving another measurable map S into a space Y g. In such a case one needs the disintegrating measures de®ned only on the sigma-®eld e 0 on generated by the map C SY T into . If the image measure Cl has a disintegration f# t g with respect to the coordinate projection onto and the measure m, and if the complement C c of the range of C has zero outer Cl measure, then the disintegrating measures can be pulled back to e 0 using the de®nition # t Cl t . Compare with LO OE E Á Á V VE E (1978, Section 30.2). It is easy to see that C c necessarily has zero inner measure. If it is not in the product sigma-®eld there might be some diculty in arguing for zero outer measure. If l were a Radon measure the set would have zero outer measure, but in that case why would one want to settle for less than the full disintegration for l? A few simple facts about disintegrations make them easy to work with. First let us be precise about when the disintegrating measures are probabilities. In essence, to get conditional probabilities one has only to standardize the disintegrating measures. The only subtlety is that standardization cannot work on a set of in®nite or zero measure.
Theorem 2. Let l have a TY "-disintegration fl t g, with l and " each sigma-®nite. Tl-almost all t, the measures
are probabilities that give a T-disintegration of l.
Proof. We abbreviate``for "-almost all t'' to``mod "'', and write t for the total mass, l t , of l t . For nonnegative measurable g,
As a service to readers who may still be getting used to our notation, we could write the last equalities as gtTldt gTxldx
The simpli®cation in the last equality occurs because gTx gt for l t -almost all x, and that g(t) can be brought outside the innermost integral as a constantÐexactly what intuition says conditional distributions should allow. For (i): If g ! 0 and "g 0 then gt 0 mod ", whence gtt 0 mod ". In particular, every "-negligible set is also Tl-negligible. Equation (3) is the formal statement that t is the density.
For (ii): Sigma-®niteness of a measure is equivalent to the existence of a strictly positive real-valued function with a ®nite integral. In particular, there exists an h b 0 for which "h`I. If t`I mod ", the function gt hta1 t is strictly positive mod " and Tlg "h`I, which makes Tl sigma-®nite. Conversely, if Tlk`I for some strictly positive k then ktt`I mod ", by (i), which gives ®niteness of t mod ".
For (iii): If t 1 mod " then equation (3) shows that Tlg "g. By assumption, " is always sigma-®nite. For the converse, let h be strictly positive with "h`I as in the previous paragraph. Choosing gt htft`1g in (3) and using the assumption that Tl " gives
which implies "f`1g 0. A similar argument shows that "f b 1g 0. For (iv): From (ii) we have "fl Ig 0, so that (i) gives Tlfl Ig 0. Take gt ft 0g in (3) to show that Tlfl 0g 0. For nonnegative measurable f, we then have
The second term is zero because l t is the zero measure when t 0. The third term is zero because "f Ig 0X & Caution! The result in part (i) can be most misleading when the image measure Tl is not sigma-®nite. For example, if T projects Lebesgue measure l on 2 onto a coordinate axis, the image measure is not sigma-®nite; it gives in®nite measure to every set of nonzero one-dimensional Lebesgue measure. In one sense the function l t 2 I is the correct Radon±Nikodym density, but the integration theory for such an extremely in®nite measure is delicate and of little use; every set has image measure either zero or in®nity. It would perhaps be better to insist that a density be ®nite almost everywhere, to avoid bad measures of this type. Only when Tl is sigma-®nite can it sensibly be used as the mixing measure ". (The reader should exercise similar caution when interpreting part (ii) of the next Theorem.)
Notice that the construction for part (iv) can be applied more generally. If m is dominated by a measure # with a ®nite density d"ad# mt, then l has a (T, #)-
Much of the convenience of working with disintegrations comes from the way they ®t nicely with image measures and densities. Most of the following results are easy consequences of the special case treated by Theorem 2. We state them in full for future reference. See HO OF FF FM MA AN NN N-Jé éR RG GE EN NS SE EN N (1994, Section 10.11) for similar assertions for probability measures, proved in more traditional notation.
Theorem 3. Let l have a TY "-disintegration {l t }, and let & be absolutely continuous with respect to l with a ®nite density rx, with each of lY ", and & sigma-®nite.
(i) The measure & has a TY m-disintegration {& t } where each & t is dominated by the corresponding l t , with density rx. (ii) The image measure T& is absolutely continuous with respect to ", with density l t r. (iii) The measures {& t } are ®nite for " almost all t if and only if T& is sigma-®nite.
(iv) The measures {& t } are probabilities for " almost all t if and only if " T&.
(v) If T& is sigma-®nite then T&fl t r 0g 0 and T&fl t r Ig 0. For T&-almost all t, the measures de®ned bỹ
are probabilities that give a T-disintegration of &.
Proof. For (i) note that &f lrf " t l t rf . The other assertions follow from Theorem 2 via the equality & t l t rX & The& t measures in part (v) are just the & t of part (i) standardized to be probability measures, on the set f0`l t r`Ig where standardization is possible. The complement of that set has zero T& measure, so it wouldn't matter if we changed the de®nition of& t there. The disintegrating measures can be changed arbitrarily on a T&-negligible set without disturbing the disintegration.
The simple formula (4) is the general version of the familiar method for calculating conditional densities as a ratio of joint density to marginal density. It is more useful than the familiar formula because it does not require the conditioning variable to be a coordinate projection on a Euclidean space with Lebesgue measure playing the role of l. LE EH HM MA AN NN N (1959, Chapter 2, Lemma 6) used a special case of (4) in his treatment of exponential families.
Example 3. Suppose P is a probability on k nÀk with density p(x, y) with respect to Lebesgue measure. Disintegrate the dominating Lebesgue measure l on n as in Example 2. Writing X for the projection onto k , we have disintegrating probability measures P x with (conditional) densities Much theory in the statistical literature is based on this special case. One supposes that each member of a family fP X P Yg is a probability on n and that T maps n smoothly into a lower-dimensional space k . One assumes existence of another smooth map S from n into n7k such that 0x TxY Sx is smoothly invertible. Inferences on the family fP X P Yg should then be equivalent to inferences on the family of image measures f0P X P Yg, for which there are densities with respect to Lebesgue measure on n in its role as the range space, qsY tY p0 À1 sY tY jsY t 5
Here j(s, t) involves the Jacobian of the transformation 0. The conditioning variable is now one of the coordinate projections, for which the conditional density can be calculated as the ratio of joint to marginal densities,
We have three qualms about this method for continuous distributions. First, it applies only to densities on Euclidean spaces. Second, it requires invention of an auxiliary map S that need be of no particular interest except that it builds the interesting T into a one-to-one transform of the dataÐone needs to force the conditioning variable to be a coordinate projection on a Euclidean space. Third, it requires extraneous smoothness assumptions about the conditioning map T, in order that the image measure might be absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. As Theorem 3 shows, one needs none of these restrictive assumptions in order to derive a conditional density analogous to the ratio of joint to marginal densities. It is merely a matter of making a proper choice for the measure to use when calculating the``marginal'' density. & Many facts about abstract conditional expectations have analogs for disintegrations that make slightly stronger assertions under slightly more restrictive circumstances. We present just one example.
Conditional expectations given sigma-®elds have the nesting property
There is an analogous formula for disintegrations, which corresponds to the idea of taking conditional expectations over the variables that are discarded in pulling back to the coarser sigma-®eld.
Example 4. Suppose l is a sigma-®nite measure on Y e with a (T, ")-disintegration {l t }, for a sigma-®nite " on Y f, which in turn has a (S, #)-disintegration {" s } for a sigma-®nite # on Y g. Here T is a measurable map from into and S is a measurable map from into . Their composition S T is a measurable map from into .
The measure l has an S TY #-disintegration {g s } given symbolically by g s " t s l t . One averages the l t disintegrations over all level sets that S maps onto s. That g s has the right averaging property follows from
That it concentrates on the right level sets follows from the concentration properties of the other two disintegrations:
because the region of integration is an empty subset of .
Sigma-®niteness of l implies existence of a strictly positive f for which lf is ®nite. Equality (6) then gives ®niteness of " t s l t f for #-almost all s; the measure g s is sigma®nite for # almost all s. &
Examples
In this section we present a small collection of examples that shows some of the bene®ts of treating conditioning as a matter of disintegration. We start (Example 5) with the EM-algorithm, where it seems that one has to work explicitly with the conditional probability measure for a particular realization of a statistic. We set aside worries that the realization might fall in the negligible set where a meddling probabilist might decide to change the disintegrating measure. Once the conditional measure is ®xed, the conditioning interpretation plays no further role in the analysisÐour ®rst example of conditioning has very little to do with conditioning.
We next turn to the Factorization Theorem for sucient statistics (Example 6), a topic that ®rst got us seriously interested in a more satisfactory way to work with conditioning. Most textbooks make it clear that the general version of the theorem is much too hard for general discussion. We feel the diculty diminishes when one thinks of conditioning as disintegration.
The third example (Example 7) shows how the disintegrating measures can inherit invariance properties under a group of transformations.
The fourth example (Example 8) proves the converse of Basu's theorem about ancillary statistics. The proof is easy. It helped us to understand the need for something beyond independence from the sucient statistic when we saw that the distributions concentrate on level sets de®ned by the disintegration.
The ®fth example (Example 9) should be common knowledge to Bayesians, who know that posterior distributions are probability measures and not just collections of measurable functions that almost hang together in the right way. Their posteriors are disintegrating measures. To make life more interesting, we allow improper priors, with a reminder that even nonBayesians make use of Bayes estimators that guarantee admissibility. One has only to be careful about in®nite expectations at awkward moments.
The sixth example (Example 10) is an elementary Bayesian problem concerning the posterior distribution for a probability concentrated on two lines. We ®rst present a non-rigorous, elementary method of solution, which we suspect would be the instinctive approach of most mathematical statisticians. (It was certainly how we initially solved the problem.) We then show how an even more general problem almost solves itself when properly framed: a small disappointment for anyone bent on demonstrating superiority of disintegrations, perhaps, but a genuine example of a method of solution that hadn't occurred to us before we started writing this paper. We recommend that our readers provide their own complete, rigorous solutions before looking at what we come up with.
Examples 11 and 12 come as a pair. They describe a marginalization paradox of ST TO ON NE E and DA AW WI ID D (1972) that can aict Bayesians with improper priors. We end up agreeing with Hartigan (1983, page 29) , who pointed out the dangers in calculating marginal distributions by integration over unwanted variables. One must be careful when interpreting independence when probabilities are not ®nite.
In Example 13 we present a disintegration interpretation of the Gibbs sampler. We could cite many stochastic process examples where the disintegration approach sheds light on complicated conditioning arguments. In an initial version of this paper we included one such applicationÐthe proof of continuity for the sample paths of martingales adapted to a Brownian ®ltrationÐand a referee pointed out other applications (interpretation of the strong Markov property; re¯ection principle for Brownian motion). For the sake of brevity, we decided to omit those examples from the ®nal version, after realizing that stochastic process experts are unlikely to need further reminder of the advantages of working with regular conditional distributions or disintegrations. The dY mis here has presumably the symbolic meaning of whatever averaging is necessary to obtain the marginal density of Y obs . The measure corresponding to In situations where the observed data are given as some arbitrary function of Y, one must concoct a Y mis so that the pair (Y obs , Y mis ) becomes a one-to-one function of Y. The density for Y then transforms into a joint density for (Y obs , Y mis ), in much the same way as in Example 3, and then the problem ®ts into a framework where conditioning can be handled by elementary means.
We would argue that in problems where data are naturally modelled as a function T(x) on a probability space Y eY P it is an unnecessary arti®ce to invent a missing function merely to accommodate EM theory to elementary methods of conditioning. One should instead start from a family of probability densities fpxY X P Yg with respect to a sigma-®nite measure l, which has a disintegration fl t g with respect to (T, "). The image measure has density 0tY l x t pxY with respect to ". For a given t, the maximum likelihood method seeks a to maximize 0tY .
More generally, one could consider the problem of maximizing a function
where fgxY X P Yg is a family of positive functions, and g is a sigma-®nite measure for which 0`G`I for each . The generalized EM algorithm consists of repeated application of two steps that improve upon an initial guess 0 for the value maximizing G. Let Q be the probability measure with density qxY gxY aG with respect to g. In the E-step one calculates the expectation
In the M-step one maximizes L 0 , or at least ®nds a 1 for which
The two steps are guaranteed to give
The last term is the Kullback±Leibler distance between Q 0 and Q 1 , which is positive by Jensen's inequality.
One then repeats the two steps, with 1 taking over the role of 0 . And so on. &
The next example is the perfect illustration of how a disintegration proof can be built by analogy with simple arguments for a discrete case. The exposition is slightly more complicated than we would have liked, because we chose not to ignore some subtleties concerning division by zero. (The reader might care to ponder how these subtleties are usually taken care of in textbook proofs for the discrete case.) We have been told that a proof similar to ours appears in a book of Borovkov, but we have not yet been able to ®nd that book.
Example 6. The intuitive de®nition of suciency says that a statistic T is sucient for a family of probability measures f X P Yg if the conditional distributions given T do not depend on . We avoid technical``diculties concerning the behavior of conditional probabilities'' by interpreting the de®nition to mean existence of a shared disintegration {P t }. That is, P t Á should serve as a conditional distribution Á j T t for every . Most often one checks for suciency by means of a factorization criterion, whose general proof has a forbidding reputation. LE EH HM MA AN NN N (1959) approached the proof in a most sensible manner, by discussing ®rst the discrete version, then a special case of the continuous version (using methods based on the transformation idea described in Example 3), and ®nally presenting (Section 2.6) the full-blown Radon±Nikodym approach of HA AL LM MO OS S and SA AV VA AG GE E (1949) only after careful measure-theoretic preparation. We were struck by the dierences between the proofs in the various cases. The disintegration interpretation allows us to use the same idea for all cases.
Consider ®rst the proof that factorization implies suciency in the discrete case. Here each is de®ned on a ®nite set with probabilities that factorize as pxY fxg gTxY hx for some statistic T. The conditional expectations are then obtained as simple ratios. For ®xed t, f j T t AE Tx t gTxY hxf x AE Tx t gTxY hx AE Tx t hxf x AE Tx t hx
The factors involving g in the numerator and denominator have cancelled out, leaving a ratio that does not depend on . (Might there be any problem with 0/0 here?) The last formula has a simple disintegration interpretation. Let us regard p(x, ) as the density of with respect to counting measure l on . With " as counting measure on , the TY "-disintegration of l has l t equal to counting measure on fT tg. The last displayed ratio is just the expectation
Conditioning as disintegration
We have included the explicit indicator function to avoid one 0/0 problem. The upper bound on l t h is automatic for the case of a ®nite set , but is needed already for countably in®nite sets. Now consider the general case, where has density gTxY hx with respect to a general sigma-®nite measure l. Suppose l has a (TY ")-disintegration {l t } for some sigma-®nite ". For a ®xed , Theorem 3 shows that has a T-disintegration f Yt g, where
By parts (ii) and (v) of the same Theorem and the concentration property of the {l t }, 0`l x t gTxY hx gtY l t h`I for T -almost all t
We are therefore almost everywhere justi®ed in cancelling out a g(t, ) factor from numerator and denominator to get
where P t Á is de®ned by (7), just as in the discrete case except for the changed meaning of l t . The disintegration property is unaected if we change the disintegrating measures for a T -negligible set of t. The {P t } also de®ne a T-disintegration for , as required for suciency. For the converse it is useful to replace l by a dominating probability measure of the form AE i 2 Ài i , for some countable subfamily f i g of . (A device due to HA AL LM MO OS S and SA AV VA AG GE E, 1949Ðsee Theorem 2 in the Appendix of LE EH HM MA AN NN N, 1959) . What matters is that the common disintegrating probabilities {P t } for each also provide a T-disintegration for , because
If we write g(t, ) for the density of T with respect to T , we have
the last equality holding because {P t } is also a disintegration for . Thus has density g(Tx, ) with respect to , and density gTxY d adl with respect to lX & Sometimes the disintegration can be identi®ed by an appeal to symmetry, or to an invariance argument, with the uniqueness of disintegrations simplifying the formal proof.
Example 7. Let P be a probability measure on a space . Suppose a probability measure P is invariant under a group q of transformations on . That is, gP P for all g in q. Suppose also that the sets fT tg are invariant under q. Does it follow that the conditional distributions are also invariant under q ?
For example, the standard normal distribution on 2 is invariant under rotations about the origin. The statistic Tx 1 Y x 2 x 2 1 x 2 2 is constant on circles centered at the origin, sets that are invariant under rotations. The conditional distributions are uniform around the circles, a fact that it usually demonstrated by means of a calculation with Jacobians. In higher dimensions the argument becomes quite messy. How much easier it would be if we could deduce the form the conditional distributions directly from invariance considerations.
The argument succeeds if q can be replaced by a countable subclass q 0 . Suppose measures invariant under q 0 are necessarily also invariant under the whole of q. Then if P is invariant under q, the conditional distributions P t must also be invariant under q, for TP-almost all t. The proof depends on the uniqueness of disintegrations.
For each bounded measurable f on , and each g in q,
Pf gPf invariance of P P f g de®nition of image measure gP
When P t concentrates on the set fT tg, so does gP t . It follows that fgP t X t P g is another disintegration for P. By uniqueness of disintegrations, there exists a TPnegligible set x g such that gP t P t for all t in x c g . Cast out a sequence of negligible setsÐone for each member of q 0 Ðto deduce that, for TP-almost all t, the probability measure P t is invariant under q 0 , and hence invariant under qX & The Borel paradox (KO OL LM MO OG GO OR RO OV V, 1993, page 50) is the classic example of an unjusti®able appeal to invariance for the construction of conditional distributions. PO OL LL LA AR RD D (1996, Chapter 5) has explained the source of the diculty, using the language of disintegration.
Example 8. Suppose T is sucient for f X P Yg on O, with disintegrating measures {P t }. Let f and g be bounded real functions on , and let S be another statistic. De®ne Gt P t gS. Then f T gS T t f tP t gS f T GT 8
In particular, g(S) and G(T) have the same expectation, C(). If S is ancillary, then the expected value C() is equal to a constant C. If T is boundedly complete, then the assertion GT C implies that concentrates on fGT Cg for each , whence
It follows that S is independent of T. That is the BA AS SU U (1955, 1958) theorem.
Conversely, if S is independent of T under each , then by choosing f G in (8) we get GT 2 GT 2 so that concentrates on the level set O fGT Cg. If there were 0 and 1 for which C 0 T C 1 , we would have a partition of Y into two nonempty subfamilies,
with the corresponding families of probability measures supported by disjoint subsets of O. If such a partition of Y is assumed impossible then C() must be a constant, that is, S must be ancillary. That is the converse to Basu's theorem. & Basu's results can be proved without the use of disintegrations. For us, the advantage of the proof with disintegrations is clean de®nition of the two sets Y 0 and Y 1 .
Bayesians work with conditional distributions, by choice. Decision theorists often apply Bayesian arguments. The next Example broadens slightly the scope of a venerable admissibility argument, as used by EA AT TO ON N (1992), for example, by removing unnecessary sigma-®niteness assumptions. Our approach is based on an idea explained to us by John Hartigan.
Example 9. Let fP t X t P g be a family of probability measures on . If the map t U 3 P t f is measurable for nonnegative measurable f on , and if % is a probability (a prior distribution) on , then a probability measure can be de®ned on by
The coordinate maps X and T have joint distribution . The fP t g have the interpretation of a T-disintegration of , that is, the conditional distribution of X given T t is P t . The X-disintegration of de®nes the Bayesian posterior distribution x Á Á j X x. If each P t has a density pxY t with respect to a sigma-®nite " on , then
That is, has density p(x, t) with respect to the product measure " %. The product measure has the trivial disintegration
if we abuse notation as in Example 2. It follows from Example 3 that x has density pxY ta% t pxY t 9
with respect to %. Even nonBayesians are interested in such estimators because they enjoy a number of nice decision theoretic properties. For example, suppose has ®nite Bayes risk
where # stands for the marginal distribution of X under . Suppose also that Ã (x) is another estimator with smaller expected loss,
Then strict inequality can hold only on a %-negligible set, for otherwise
The de®ning property of (x) requires the last integrand to be everywhere nonnegative, which gives a contradiction to the inequality (12). The preceding argument has little to do with % or any of the disintegrating { x } being probability measures, nor with # being the marginal X distribution. It is valid for any (X, #) disintegration and any sigma-®nite % (an improper prior), provided the Bayes estimator de®ned by equality (10) has ®nite Bayes risk L(t, (x)).
For example, if P t is the Bin(n, t) distribution and % is the improper prior with density t À1 1 À t À1 with respect to Lebesgue measure l on (0, 1), then has density pxY t n x t xÀ1 1 À t nÀxÀ1 with respect to l ", where m is counting measure on {0, 1, . . . , n}. The marginal measure # X is not sigma-®nite; it puts in®nite mass at 0 and at n. Nevertheless, has an XY "-disintegration with x having density p(x, t) with respect to l. Notice that x is a ®nite measure for 1 x n À 1, and both 0 and n are in®nite (but sigma-®nite).
For 1 x n À 1 the usual argument shows that the estimator x xan minimizes the posterior expected loss. It also minimizes
for the trivial reason that the integral is ®nite only when equals zero. Similar trivial
Conditioning as disintegration reasoning applies to n . The estimator is Bayes for the improper prior %, with a ®nite Bayes risk,
The inequality corresponding to (11) could hold only on a %-negligible set. As both sides of that inequality would be polynomials in t, the negligible set would have to be empty: a contradiction. The Bayes estimator is admissible for quadratic loss. & Example 10. Suppose a distribution P on 2 concentrates on two straight lines, L 1 and L 2 , neither of them orthogonal to the x-axis. Suppose the total mass p i that P assigns to L i is distributed according to a density g i with respect to Lebesgue measure along the line. An observation (XY Y ) is taken from P giving a point with X x 0 . What is the conditional probability that the point lies on the line L 1 ?
The elementary method approximates fX x 0 g by fx 0 X x 0 g, for a small positive , then argues that
where 1/ i is the absolute value of the cosine of the angle between L i and the x-axis. The small factors cancel out, leaving an equality
Write H 1 (x 0 ) for the last ratio. If one wants a totally rigorous derivation using the Kolmogorov approach, one can easily check the de®ning property analogous to (1), fXY Y P L 1 gfX P Bg H 1 X fX P Bg for all Borel sets B. Alternatively, one might appeal to some sort of abstract dierentiation theorem to guarantee existence of the limiting ratio and justify its interpretation as a conditional probability.
Both rigorous derivations would obscure the simple form of the conditional probability distribution fÁ j X x 0 g, which puts mass H 1 (x 0 ) at the point where L 1 intersects the line where X x 0 , and mass 1 À H 1 x 0 at the corresponding point on L 2 . Provided (XY Y ) does not land at the intersection of the two lines, this conditional probability distribution gives the asserted mass to line L 1 . We prefer an argument that identi®es the conditional distribution directly, rather than have it emerge indirectly from a calculation of uncertain rigor.
To determine the X-disintegration of P we need ®rst to be precise about what we mean by a distribution with a density with respect to Lebesgue measure along a line in 2 . Bring everything back to the x-axis , by regarding Lebesgue measure along L i as the image of i times Lebesgue measure " along . The geometry of the lines enters only through the i factors. The measure with density p i g i Á with respect to Lebesgue measure on L i is just the image of the measure " i with density h i x i p i g i x with respect to ". Now we can forget all about lines and Lebesgue measure, and solve a more general problem.
Suppose " is a sigma-®nite measure on and that h 1 , . . . , h k are nonnegative integrable functions on . Let 2 1 , . . . , 2 k be measurable maps into another space . Let " i be the ®nite measure with density h i with respect to ". Let Q i be the image of " i under the map 0 i that takes x onto xY 2 i x. That is, Q i is the result of sliding " i to live on the graph of 2 i in the product space . De®ne P to be the sum of the Q i . What is the conditional distribution PÁ j X x?
Formally,
Taking the " outside the last sum we immediately get a representation of P as an XY "-disintegration,
where P x is the measure that puts mass h i (x) at the points (x, 2 i (x)) for i 1Y F F F Y k.
Notice that P x is not a probability, but it does live on the set fX xg. To make the disintegrating measures probabilities, we need to standardize as prescribed by Theorem 2. For i 1Y F F F Y k the conditional probability measure PÁ j X x) (that is, the X-disintegrating measure) puts mass h i xah 1 x Á Á Á h k x, except at the negligible set of x values where the denominator is zero. &
The result from the previous Example is a solution to a Bayesian problem posed to us by John Hartigan. LE E CA AM M (1986, page 477) has used an analogous disintegration to establish a bound on Hellinger anities for convex hulls. With reference to this result, DO ON NO OH HO O and LI IU U (1991, page 644) remarked that``Le Cam has established a fact which seems, at ®rst, quite similar to . . . but is in fact far deeper''. The case of ®nite convex combinations is a simple consequence of an identity like (13); the general case is a consequence of a general disintegration.
For a measure l on a product space it is traditional to use the name -marginal for the image of l under the map X that projects onto the coordinate space. If l happens to be a product of probability measures, P #, the -marginal equals P. One can safely refer to both Pfx P X x P Ag and P #fxY y P X x P Ag as``the probability that X lies in the set A''. However, if # is not a probability measure, the -marginal of l does not equal P. At worst, # might not even be a ®nite measure, in which case the image measure assigns mass I to every A with PA b 0. In this situation there is real danger in thinking of the -and -coordinates as being independent, or even in thinking of P as the distribution of X. Bayesians with a penchant for improper priors should be particularly aware of this problem.
Example 11. Suppose (XY Y ) has strictly positive probability density f(x, y) with respect to Lebesgue measure on the unit square 0Y 1 0Y 1. Then, in traditional notation, X has marginal density f X x 1 0 f xY y dy and the conditional distribution of Y given X x has conditional density f YjX y j x f xY yaf X x. Given X x and Y y, let the Z distribution be the constant multiple 1/f(x, y) times Lebesgue measure on . The joint (improper) distribution of (X, Y, Z) is equal to three-dimensional Lebesgue measure l on 0Y 1 0Y 1 .
With l expressed as a product of Lebesgue measure on each coordinate space, we might be tempted to think of X, Y, and Z as independent, each uniformly distributed. Indeed, for a product of proper probability measures, the coordinate maps are independent random variables with those probabilities as their marginal distributions. However, our Example involves products of improper distributions: the Z marginal is Lebesgue measureÐthe improper uniform distribution on the real lineÐ and conditional on Z z, the pair XY Y is uniformly distributed on the square. (That is, we have a Z-disintegration of l with Lebesgue measure on the unit square as disintegrating measure.) Since the last conditional distribution does not depend on z, we might conclude that (XY Y ) is uniform on the square, so that X and Y are independent and uniform on (0, 1). Or should we use the (XY Y )-marginal measure, which is very in®nite, as the joint distribution? Or should we stick with the original f xY y density?
Is there any paradox in XY Y appearing to have several dierent joint distributions? We think not.
The confusion arises because Lebesgue measure on 0Y 1 0Y 1 can be disintegrated in many dierent ways. The XY Y -image measure is not sigma-®nite; it cannot be used as the mixing measure in an XY Y -disintegration. With the image measure no longer a candidate, there are many equally plausible mixing measures and disintegrations, giving many dierent plausible answers for the joint distribution of X and Y and for the conditional distribution of Y given X.
When one works only with probability measures, all arguments lead back to the same joint (marginal) distributions. With in®nite measures, dierent derivations can lead to dierent measures. One should exercise some care in bestowing the title of joint distribution. &
The rather obvious sort of distinction in the last Example can become much more puzzling when buried within more complicated collections of marginal and conditional distributions, as in the following marginalization paradox of ST TO ON NE E and DA AW WI ID D (1972) . When their constructions are expressed as explicit assertions about disintegrations, the¯aw behind the paradox is quickly revealed.
And again we would be misled by the analogy with Example 4. The Z-marginal is still not sigma-®nite, no matter how it is calculated.
Formulae (16) and (18) appear contradictoryÐa paradox. We would explain the paradox by pointing out that neither formula represents a disintegration of the (Y, Z)-marginal with the Z-marginal as mixing measure. There is no such disintegration. The assertions (15) and (17) are ®ne; each statement gives a disintegration with respect to a sigma-®nite measure. In both cases, the trouble comes when we are tempted to throw away one of the conditioning variables, leaving just the variable Z, whose image measure is not sigma-®nite. We must live with the fact that distributions conditional on Z are not determined uniquely. So there is no such thing as the Y j Z conditional density. Indeed, in this case, much as in Example 11, the (Y, Z ) image measure is not sigma-®nite. So in constructing a (Y, Z )-disintegration for the joint distribution of (F, Y, X, Z ), we are left with a rather arbitrary choice of what measure to use as the (Y, Z )-mixing measure. If we then regard our choice of (Y, Z )-mixing measures as the``joint distribution'' for that pair of variables, then clearly we can arrive at many dierent``conditional distributions'' for Y j Z .
More concisely, by integrating out variables in dierent orders we have constructed
All integrals correspond to probability measures, except for the ®rst``L 0 Á Á Á'' and the second``L Recall that a distribution P being stationary for a Markov chain X 0 , X 1 , . . . means that, if X 0 $ P, then X n $ P for all n. The theoretical foundation of Markov sampling methods is the convergence in distribution of a Markov chain to its stationary distribution: If a Markov chain X 0 , X 1 , . . . has stationary distribution P, then under quite general conditions (involving irreducibility and aperiodicity), the distribution of X n for large n is close to P. Thus, in order to generate an observation from a desired distribution P on , we ®nd a Markov chain X 0 , X 1 , . . . on that has P as its stationary distribution. The theory then suggests that running or simulating the chain until a large time n will produce a random variable X n whose distribution is close to the desired P. By taking n large enough, in principle we obtain a value that may for practical purposes be considered a random draw from the distribution P.
The Gibbs sampler is a way of constructing a Markov chain having a desired stationary distribution. To illustrate the idea, consider a product space with coordinate maps S and T. The problem is to generate an observation from a given probability measure P on . We assume that both S-and T-disintegrations of P exist, giving conditional probability distributions that we will denote as PÁ j S Á and PÁ j T ÁX To perform a Gibbs sampler, start with any initial point (S 0 , T 0 ). Then generate S 1 from the conditional distribution PÁ j T T 0 , and generate T 1 from the conditional distribution PÁ j S S 1 . Continue on in this way, generating S 2 from the conditional distribution PÁ j T T 1 and T 2 from the conditional distribution PÁ j S S 2 , and so on. Then the distribution P is stationary for the Markov chain fS n Y T n X n 0Y 1Y F F Fg. To see this, suppose S 0 Y T 0 $ P. In particular, T 0 is distributed according to the T-marginal of P, so that, since S 1 is drawn from the conditional distribution of S given T T 0 , we have S 1 Y T 0 $ P. Now we use the same reasoning again: S 1 is distributed according to the S-marginal SP, so that S 1 Y T 1 $ P.
Here is a general formulation of the Gibbs sampler in terms of disintegrations. Suppose we wish to simulate an observation from a probability measure P on a space . The Gibbs sampler consists of a sequence of``moves'' that tell us how to choose a new point X n1 , given a current point X n . For each map T for which a T-disintegration {P t } of P exists, there is a corresponding``T-move'', which is conditional expectations of only countably many random variablesÐas in the theory of discrete-time martingales, for exampleÐthen there is no need to bring in topological tools to manage the almost sure equivalences. However, in statistical problems many surprises can lie hidden in the formulations using conditioning on sigma-®elds.
Consider, for example, the concept of suciency. One could call a sub-sigma-®eld q sucient for a family of probability measures on (O, p ) if, for each bounded p -measurable random variable X there exists a single q-measurable Y for which equality (20) holds for every in . That is the standard rigorous de®nition. As BU UR RK KH HO OL LD DE ER R (1961) showed, the de®nition allows some disturbing consequences, such as the possibility of a sucient q being contained in a ®ner sigma-®eld q Ã that is not sucient for . If the intuition behind suciency says that q contains all the information about which in we are sampling from, then how can q Ã be telling us something extra? Apparently, the abstract de®nition has let a few nonintuitive beasts through the gate. In the case of a dominated family no such problem can existÐ compare with the factorization theorem of Example 6.
In some situations even the abstract de®nition is too concrete; the interpretation of Y X j q as a random variable (or as an equivalence class of random variables) becomes super¯uous. We can identify Y with a transition operator g, mapping L 1 Y p into L 1 (, q ), identi®ed by the analog of equality (20),
And then we can dispense with Y altogether and express conditioning properties purely in terms of a transition operator. DA AW WI ID D (1980) chose something similar as the best way to deal with the general form of conditional independence. Finally, one can dispense with the interpretation of the domains of probability measures as families of random variables on a speci®c O set, and treat conditioning as a transition map between abstract spaces, as in HA AR RT TI IG GA AN N's (1983) development of Bayes theory, or LE E CA AM M's (1986) theory for convergence of experiments.
By stripping away assumptions unnecessary for the development of a particular statistical or probabilistic idea, one gains in generality and sometimes even in insight. We would claim that disintegrations oer more insight into something like the factorization criterion for suciency than a collection of more elementary calculations for speci®c cases, sometimes involving unnecessary technical assumptions to accommodate the details of a particular method. In the same way, disintegrations could be regarded as overly restrictive, involving unnecessary topological assumptions in many abstract conditioning arguments using Radon±Nikodym derivatives. And so on.
Conditioning is one of the most important ideas of probability and statistics. It is needed at many dierent levels of understanding. We see great value in there also being many ways of formalizing its mathematical description, each suited to a dierent purpose. Here is a condensed proof of the Existence Theorem 1, based on ideas from DE EL LL LA AC CH HE ER RI IE E and ME EY YE ER R (1978, page 78) . We agree with them that``The theorem on disintegration of measures has a bad reputation, and probabilists often try to avoid the use of conditional distributions . . . But it really is simple and easy to prove.''
The assumptions let us reduce the proofs of both existence and uniqueness to the case where is compact and both l and " are ®nite measures. (Partition into countably many disjoint sets B i , each of ®nite " measure. Partition each T À1 B i into sets N i Y K i1 Y K i2 Y F F F Y with lN i 0 and each K ij compact. For existence, construct ®nite disintegrating measures for the restriction of l to K ij and " restricted to B i , then piece together the restrictions. Notice that each disintegrating measure will be sigma®nite, being constructed from countably many ®nite measures concentrated on disjoint sets. For uniqueness, combine the trivial result for the restriction of l to a negligible set with the result for compact sets.)
De®ne a ®nite measure # (the image of l under the map that takes x onto (x, Tx)) on e f by #hxY t lhxY TxX It lives on the graph of T, in the sense that #fxY t X Tx T tg 0 21
This assertion follows from the countable generation property, and the fact that f contains all the singleton sets. (Let f 0 be the countable subclass that generates f. For each t P , the singleton ftg is equal to ftg fB P f 0 X t P Bg, which implies that fxY t X Tx T tg B P f 0 fTx a P BY t P Bg. For ®xed B in f 0 , #fTx P BY t a P Bg lfTx P BY Tx a P Bg 0
The set fTx T tg is a countable union of #-negligible sets.) Now we use compactness to avoid the problem, mentioned at the start of Section 2, with uncountable families of negligible sets. The trick is to reduce countable additivity to a condition involving only countably many assertions about conditional expectations. On the real line one can determine measures from the values taken by their distribution functions at a countable dense set. On more general spaces, the following consequence of the Riesz representation theorem, and of the fact that there exists a sequence of functions dense in the space of all continuous real functions on (under the uniform metric), suces.
If is a compact metric space then there exists a countable family g 0 of nonnegative, continuous functions on such that (i) g 0 is closed under addition (ii) for each additive functional X g 0 3 there exists a unique Borel measure L such that f L f for each f in g 0 .
